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ELGEsa .^ WATERFALL & JONES 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
AMERICA FIRST BUILDING 
4768 HARRISON BOULEVARD 
OGDEN, UTAH 84403-4305 
MICHAEL D LYON 
JACKC HELGESEN 
R SCOTT WATERFALL 
RICHARD W JONES 
MICHAEL V HOUTZ 
May 1, 1992 
F I L E D 
MAY t 1992 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
HAND DELIVERED 
Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk of the Court 
Supreme Court of Utah 
332 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Brumley v. Utah State Tax Commission, No. 910103 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
Enclosed is the recent U.S. Law Week copy of Barker v. Kansas, 
91-611 (U.S. April 21, 1992). This is a pertinent and significant 
authority that should be brought to the Court's attention for the 
following reasons: 
1. Barker conclusively decides the issue of how military retirees 
should be treated under Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 
U.S. 803 (1989), by holding that military retirees are in the same 
position as other federal retirees for purposes of § 4 U.S.C. ill. 
This issue was argued orally and briefed by defendants on pages 28-
30 of their brief and pages 26-28 of their reply brief, and by 
plaintiffs on pages 88-90 of their brief. 
2. Barker retroactively applied Davis as controlling law to the 
years 84-89 over the objection of an amicus brief filed by the 
State of Utah wherein the State of Utah argued the Court should 
expressly reserve the issue of retroactivity, since silence would 
make Davis retroactive under the rule of James B. Beam Distilling 
Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991). Reference to this issue 
was made by defendants on pages 47-75 of their brief and on pages 
2-5 of their reply brief, and by plaintiffs on pages 17-22 of their 
brief. A copy of the state's amicus brief is attached. 
Sincerely, 
FAX 
(801) 479 4804 
TELEPHONE 
(801) 479 4777 
RWJ:j g 
Enclosures 
cc: Brian L. Tarbet 
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U. S. App. D. C. 174, 181, 466 F. 2d 345, 352 (case below)). 
See Joint Stipulation of Facts 24a-25a. The United States 
avers that such disclaimers have been requested on a case-
by-case basis since 1970 and that "Alaska fails to explain 
why the Corps' approach is improper or what specific 
advantages would result from identifying the option 
through a formal regulation." Brief for United States in 
Opposition 16. 
We cannot say that in this case the Corps acted in an 
arbitrary or capricious manner. It notified state officials 
promptly that the Solicitor of the Interior Department 
objected to issuance of the permit; it specified a curative 
option that could be pursued; and it afforded Alaska ample 
time to consider the disclaimer, to consult with federal 
officials, and then to draft the disclaimer. See Joint 
Stipulation of Facts 2-7, App. to Joint Stipulation of Facts 
lla-16a, 17a-19a, 20a-21a, 22a-23a, 24a, 26a-31a. Nor can 
Alaska contend that it lacked notice, since the disclaimer it 
filed in this case is similar in form to those which it has 
filed in past § 10 permit proceedings. See Joint Lodging of 
Permits and Disclaimers.14 We conclude that the Corps' 
actions in this case were neither arbitrary nor capricious. 
V 
Accordingly, we hold that the Secretary of the Army acted 
within his discretion in conditioning approval of the Nome 
port facilities construction permit on a disclaimer by Alaska 
of a change in the federal-state boundary that might be 
caused by the Nome project. The United States' motion for 
summary judgment is granted, and Alaska's motion for 
summary judgment is denied. 
It is so ordered. 
JEFFREY P MINEAR, Assistant to the Solicitor General, on the 
briefs, for plaintiff, JOHN G. GISSBERG, Alaska Assistant Attorney 
General (CHARLES COLE, Atty. Gen., on the briefs) for defendant. 
No. 91-611 
KEYTON E. BARKER AND PAULINE BARKER, ET AL., 
PETITIONERS v. KANSAS ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
KANSAS 
Syllabus 
No. 91-611. Argued March 3, 1992—Decided April 21, 1992 
Title 4 U. S. C. §111 authorizes the States to tax federal employees' 
compensation if the taxation does not discriminate against the 
employees because of the compensation's source. After Davis v. 
Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, invalidated, under §111 
14Indeed, one such disclaimer dated December 1, 1980, for a project in 
the oil-nch Prudhoe Bay, stated as follows: 
"In consideration of the issuance, by the Secretary of the Army 
or his authorized representative, of a permit for construction of an 
extension to the ARCO dock at Prudhoe Bay for purposes of the 
waterflood project designed to result m substantial secondary 
recovery from the existing Prudhoe Bay oil and gas field, pursuant 
to the application filed by ARCO and SOHIO, the State of Alaska 
agrees that the shoreline, coast line, and boundaries of the State of 
Alaska are not to be deemed to be in any way affected by the 
construction, maintenance, or operation of such extension. This 
Agreement should be construed as a binding disclaimer by the State 
of Alaska to the effect that the State does not, and will not, treat 
the ARCO dock waterflood extension as extending its coast line for 
purposes of the Submerged Lands Art " .Tmnt T ^ ^ " " ~<"° A 
and the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity, the Michigan 
income tax imposed on the benefits of federal, but not state and local, 
civil service retirees, petitioners filed suit in a Kansas state court 
challenging that Statp's imposition of an income tax on federal 
military retirement benefits but not on the benefits received by 
retired state and local government employees. In affirming the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment for the state defendants, the 
State Supreme Court concluded that military retirement benefits 
constitute reduced pay for reduced current services, in contrast to the 
deferred compensation for past services embodied in state and local 
government retirement benefits, and that this "significant differ-
enc[e]" justified the State's differential treatment of the two classes 
of retirees under Davis, supra, at 816. 
Held: The Kansas tax on military retirees is inconsistent with §111. 
The State Supreme Court's conclusion that, for purposes of state 
taxation, military retirement benefits may be characterized as current 
compensation for reduced current services does not survive analysis 
on several bases. First, there are no "significant differences" between 
military retirees and state and local government retirees in terms of 
calculating retirement benefits. The amount of retired pay a service 
member receives is computed not on the basis of the continuing 
duties he actually performs, but on the basis of years served on 
active duty and the rank obtained pnor to retirement. Military 
benefits thus are determined m a manner very similar to that of the 
Kansas Public Employee Retirement System. Second, this Court's 
precedents discussing military retirement pay provide no support for 
the state court's holding. The statement in United States v. Tyler, 
105 U. S. 244, 245, that such pay is effectively indistinguishable from 
current compensation at a reduced rate was made m the context of 
the particular holding of that case, and cannot be taken as establish-
ing that retirement benefits are for all purposes the equivalent of 
current compensation for reduced current services. And, although 
McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U. S. 210, 222, referred to Tyler, it did not 
expressly approve Tylers description of military retirement pay, but 
specifically reserved the question whether federal law prohibits a 
State from characterizing such pay as deferred compensation and 
urged the States to tread with caution in this area. Third, an 
examination of other federal statutes treating military retirement pay 
indicates that Congress for many purposes does not consider such pay 
to be current compensation for reduced current services. See, e. g., 
10 U. S. C. § 1408(c)(1); 26 U. S. C. §219(0(1). Thus, military 
retirement benefits, like the benefits paid to Kansas government 
retirees, are to be considered deferred pay for past services for 
purposes of § 111. 
249 Kan. 186, 815 P. 2d 46, reversed and remanded. 
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. STEVENS, 
J., filed a concurring opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined. 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The State of Kansas taxes the benefits received from the 
United States by military retirees but does not tax the 
benefits received by retired state and local government 
employees. Kan. Stat. Ann. §79-3201 et seq. (1989).1 The 
issue before us is whether the tax imposed on the military 
retirees is inconsistent with 4 U. S. C. § 111, which pro-
vides: 
lAs the Kansas Supreme Court explained, to arrive at the adjusted 
gross income of a taxpayer under the Kansas Income Tax Act, the 
starting point is the adjusted gross income under the federal Interna] 
Revenue Code, which includes retirement benefits received by retired 
military officials and state and local government retirees. 249 Kan. 186, 
190-191, 815 P. 2d 46, 49-50 (1991). As relevant for present purposes, 
in calculating Kansas' adjusted gross income, the retirement benefits of 
state and local governments are deducted and are exempt from taxation. 
See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-32,117(cXn) (Supp.k1990), § 74-4923(b) (Supp. 
1990); see also 249 Kan., at 190-191, 815 P. 2d, at 49-50 (listing classes 
exempt from state taxation). Benefits received under the Federal Civil 
Service Retirement System and b> retired railroad employees are also 
exempt. Kan. Stat. Ann. §§79-32,117(cXvii) and (vni) (Supp. 1990). Not 
deducted and hence taxable are benefits received by retired military 
personnel, certain CIA employees, officials serving in the National 
4-21-92 The United diaie* 1^* ** 
"The United States consents to the taxation of pay or 
compensation for personal service as an officer or em-
ployee of the United States, a territory or possession or 
political subdivision thereof, the government of the 
District of Columbia, or an agency or instrumentality 
of one or more of the foregoing, by a duly constituted 
taxing authority having jurisdiction, if the taxation 
does not discriminate against the officer or employee 
because of the source of the pay or compensation." 
Shortly after our decision in Davis v. Michigan Dept. of 
Treasury, 489 U. S. 803 (1989), which invalidated under 
§111 the Michigan income tax imposed on federal civil 
service retirees, two class actions were filed in Kansas 
District Court challenging the state income tax imposed on 
military retirement benefits. Together the classes com-
prised some 14,000 military retirees, who received federal 
armed forces retirement benefits and were subject to the 
Kansas income tax for one or more of the tax years from 
1984 through 1989. The classes also included spouses of 
the retirees, where applicable. Plaintiff taxpayers sought 
a declaratory judgment that the Kansas income tax discrim-
inates against them in favor of state and local government 
retirees, in violation of § 111 and the constitutional princi-
ples of intergovernmental tax immunity applied in Davis. 
They also requested a permanent injunction to prohibit 
assessment of the tax against military retirees, as well as 
refunds of any taxes paid by class members for the tax 
years 1984 through 1989.2 The District Court granted 
summary judgment for the defendants, and the Supreme 
Court of Kansas affirmed. We granted certiorari because 
the holding below is arguably inconsistent with our decision 
in Davis and conflicts with decisions of other state courts of 
last resort. 502 U. S. (1991).3 
Our approach to deciding this case is controlled by Davis, 
which invalidated a Michigan law that imposed taxes on 
federal civil service retirees' benefits but not on benefits 
received by state and local government retirees. In reach-
ing that decision, we traced the history of 4 U. S. C. § 111 
and concluded that "the retention of immunity in §111 is 
coextensive with the prohibition against discriminatory 
taxes embodied in the modern constitutional doctrine of 
intergovernmental tax immunity." 489 U. S., at 813. 
Under that doctrine, we evaluate a state tax that is alleged 
to discriminate against federal employees in favor of state 
employees by inquiring "whether the inconsistent tax 
treatment is directly related to, and justified by, 'significant 
differences between the two classes.'" Id., at 816 (quoting 
Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School DisL, 
361 U. S. 376, 383 (I960)). 
Well aware of Davis, the State Supreme Court undertook 
such an inquiry and concluded that significant differences 
existed between military retirees, who are taxed by Kansas, 
and state and local government retirees, who are not. The 
court proceeded to consider the State's six proffered 
distinctions between military retirees and state and local 
2
 The taxpayers also relied on the Supremacy Clause of the United 
States Constitution, the Pnvileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and Article 11, § 2, of the Kansas Constitution. 
The taxpayers further alleged that the State deprived them of their civil 
rights as secured by the United States Constitution and laws in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. See 249 Kan., 
at 188, 815 P. 2d, at 48. 
3
 See, e. g.,Kuhn v. State, 817 P. 2d 101 (Colo. 1991) (en banc); Pledger 
v. Bosmck, 306 Ark. 45, 811 S. W. 2d 286 (1991); and Hackman v. 
Director of Revenue, 111 S. W. 2d 77 (Mo. 1989) {en banc), cert, denied, 
pensioners: 
"(1) [FJederal military retirees remain members of 
the armed forces of the United States after they retire 
from active duty; they are retired from active duty only; 
(2) federal military retirees are subject to the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and may be court 
martialed for offenses committed after retirement; (3) 
they are subject to restrictions on civilian employment 
after retirement; (4) federal military retirees are 
subject to involuntary recall; (5) federal military 
retirement benefits are not deferred compensation but 
current pay for continued readiness to return to duty; 
and (6) the federal military retirement system is 
noncontributory and funded by annual appropriations 
from Congress; thus, all benefits received by military 
retirees have never been subject to tax." 249 Kan. 186, 
196, 815 P. 2d 46, 53(1991). 
The court deemed the first four differences significant, 
not because in themselves they justified disparate tax 
treatment, but because they supported the fifth distinc-
tion—that military retirement benefits constitute reduced 
pay for reduced current services, rather than deferred 
compensation for past services. Id., at 197, 815 P. 2d, at 
53. By contrast, "state and local government retirement 
benefits are deferred compensation," the court found, and 
"not current pay." Ibid. The court concluded that this 
principal distinction between military retirees and state and 
local government retirees justified their differential treat-
ment under the State's tax laws. Accordingly, it held that 
a military retiree's benefits were as legally subject to state 
taxation as the income of active military personnel, whose 
pay was liable for state taxation pursuant to the United 
States' consent, as expressed in 4 U. S. C. §111. 
Military retirees unquestionably remain in the service 
and are subject to restrictions and recall; in these respects 
they are different from other retirees, including the state 
and local government retirees whom Kansas does not tax. 
But these differences, standing alone, do not justify the 
differential tax treatment at issue in this case. Nor do 
these differences persuasively indicate that, for purposes of 
4 U. S. C. § 111, Kansas may treat military retirement pay 
as reduced pay for reduced services. As a general matter, 
a military retiree is entitled to a stated percentage of the 
pay level achieved at retirement, multiplied by the years of 
creditable service. Brief for United States as Amicus 
Curiae 11, n. 16. In this respect, "retired [military] pay 
bears some of the features of deferred compensation. The 
amount of retired pay a service member receives is calculat-
ed not on the basis of the continuing duties he actually 
performs, but on the basis of years served on active duty 
and the rank obtained prior to retirement." McCarty v. 
McCarty, 453 U. S. 210, 223, n. 16 (1981). By taking into 
account years of service, the formula used to calculate 
retirement benefits leaves open the possibility of creating 
disparities among members of the same preretirement rank. 
Such disparities cannot be explained on the basis of 
"current pay for current services," since presumably retirees 
subject to these benefit differentials would be performing 
the same "services." Furthermore, military benefits are 
determined in a manner very similar to that of the Kansas 
Public Employee Retirement System. Brief for United 
States as Amicus Curiae 11, n. 16. In terms of calculating 
retirement benefits, therefore, we see no significant 
differences between military retirees and state and local 
government retirees that justify disparate tax treatment by 
the State, 
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In holding to the contrary, however, the Kansas Supreme 
Court found support m some of our precedents In United 
States v. Tyler, 105 U S 244 (1882), for example, the Court 
decided that officers retired from active military service 
were entitled to the same percentage increase m pay that 
a statute had provided for active officers The Court 
reached this result m part by characterizing military 
retirement pay as "compensation [that] is contmued at a 
reduced rate, and the connection is continued, with a 
retirement from active service only " Id , at 245 4 
The State Supreme Court also found support m McCarty, 
supra In that case the California courts considered the 
applicability of state community property laws to the 
military retirement benefits for which an officer who had 18 
years of service would be eligible 2 years hence The 
California courts had held these benefits subject to division 
upon dissolution of the marriage In this Court the officer 
challenged the holding on two grounds first, that his 
prospective retirement benefits would be current pay, not 
subject to division as deferred compensation for services 
performed during the marriage, and second, that applying 
the community property law to retirement benefits conflict-
ed with the federal military scheme regardless of whether 
retired pay is current income or deferred compensation 
See id , at 221 Citing and quoting Tyler, supra, our 
opinion noted that military retirees differed m some 
respects from other retired federal personnel and that these 
differences had led various courts, "including this one," to 
opme that military retirement pay is reduced compensation 
for reduced current services 453 U S , at 222 We found 
no need, however, to decide "whether federal law prohibits 
a State from characterizing retired pay as deferred compen-
sation," because wTe sustained petitioner's alternative 
ground for overturning the judgment below Id , at 223 
The Kansas Supreme Court reasoned that McCarty's 
recognition of the Tyler holding, as well as the decisions of 
several Courts of Appeals, indicated that Tyler controlled 
the description of military retirement pay It thus conclud-
ed that taxing military retirement pay as current income 
could not validly be characterized as chscriminating in favor 
of state and local government employees, whose benefits 
were exempt as bemg deferred compensation for past 
services See 249 Kan , at 198, 815 P 2d, at 54 For 
several reasons, we find this reading of our precedents 
unpersuasive 
First, Tyler's statement that retirement pay is effectively 
indistinguishable from current compensation at a reduced 
rate was unnecessary to reach the result that Congress 
intended to include the retirement benefits of a certam 
class of retired officers in its provision for increasing the 
pay of active-duty officers In holding that such retired 
officers were eligible for this mcrease, the Court based its 
holding on the "uniform treatment" of retired and active 
officers m various statutory provisions that made the 
retired officers "a part of the army" for purposes of deter-
mining eligibility for the increase Tyler, 105 U S , at 
4
 The Court explained 
"It is impossible to hold that men who are by statute declared to be a 
part of the army who may wear its uniform, whose names shall be borne 
upon its register who may be assigned by their superior officers to 
specified duties by detail as other officers are, wno are subject to the 
rules and articles of war, and may be tried, not by a jury, as other 
citizens are, but by a military court martial for any breach of those 
rules, and who may finalh hp Hionnc^^ — 
245-246 The Court descnbed "a manifest difference m the 
two kinds of retirement, namely, retiring from active service 
and retiring wholly and altogether from the service " Id , 
at 245 The latter group were ineligible for the pay 
increase because their connection to the service had been 
completely terminated In interpreting the applicable 
statutory provisions, therefore, the "uniform treatment" of 
active-duty and the one class of retired officers was crucial 
to the decision, Tyler thus cannot be taken as establishing 
that retirement benefits are for all purposes the equivalent 
of current compensation for reduced current services 
Moreover, although McCarty referred to Tyler, it did not 
expressly approve Tyler's description of military retirement 
pay To the contrary, by declining to hold that federal law 
forbade the States from treating military retirement pay as 
deferred income and resting our decision on another 
ground, we reserved the question for another case To 
punctuate this point, we noted that, despite Tyler, the state 
courts were divided as to whether military retirement pay 
is current income or deferred compensation See McCarty, 
453 U S , at 222-223 nn 15 and 16 We also stated that 
although military retirement pay bears some of the features 
of deferred compensation, two indicia of retired military 
service include a restriction on activities and a chance of 
bemg recalled to active duty Hence, "the possibilitv that 
Congress intended military retired pay to be m part current 
compensation for those risks and restnctions suggests that 
States must tread with caution in this area, lest they 
disrupt the federal scheme' Id , at 224, n 16 (emphasis 
added) 
In urging States to be cautious in treatmg military retire-
ment pay, McCarty thus should not be read to consider 
Tyler as settlmg the issue Indeed, our handling of the 
community property dissolution issue suggests the opposite 
In McCarty we said that "[t]he community property division 
of military retired pay rests on the premise that that pay, 
like a typical pension, represents deferred compensation for 
services performed during the marriage " 453 U S , at 221 
Had we accepted as definitive for all purposes Tyler's 
characterization of such pay as current income, our decision 
in McCarty would have been simple because we would have 
been foreclosed from treatmg military retired pay as de-
ferred compensation Such a holding would have been a 
much easier way of deciding McCarty than the alternative 
basis for decision—that the application of California's 
community property law conflicted with the federal military 
retirement scheme 
Finding no support for the Kansas Supreme Court's 
holding either m differences in the method of calculating 
benefits or in our precedents discussing military retirement 
pay, we examine congressional intent, as inferred through 
other applicable statutes that treat military retirement pay. 
Promptly after McCarty, for example, Congress enacted the 
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, 10 
U S C § 1408(c)(1), which negated McCarty's holding by 
giving the States the option of treating military retirement 
pay "either as property solely of the member or as property 
of the member and his spouse m accordance with the law of 
the jurisdiction of such court " Because the premise behind 
permittmg the States to apply their community property 
laws to military retirement pay is that such pay is deferred 
compensation for past services, see McCarty, supra, at 221, 
Congress clearly believed that payment to military retirees 
is m many respects not comparable to ordinary remunera-
1-21-92 The United States i 
diat military retirement pay should be treated as indistin-
guishable from compensation for reduced current services. 
Furthermore, both federal and Kansas income tax law 
treat military retirement pay as deferred compensation for 
the purpose of determining deductibility of contributions to 
an individual retirement account (IRA). For federal 
purposes, an IRA deduction is limited to the amount of the 
taxpayer's compensation or $2,000, whichever is less. But 
the term "compensation" does not include "any amount 
received as a pension or annuity and does not include any 
amount received as deferred compensation." 26 U. S. C. 
§ 219(f)(1). Under this provision, military retirement 
benefits are not compensation for the purpose of making 
deductible contributions to an IRA. See generally M. 
Weinstein, Mertens Law of Federal Income Taxation 
§25C.12, p. 58 (1988). The State Supreme Court in this 
case noted that the Kansas tax law follows the federal 
scheme and does not t reat military retirement pay as 
current compensation for IRA purposes, like other types of 
retirement benefits. 249 Kan., at 201-202, 815 P. 2d, at 56. 
The court believed tha t this treatment of military retire-
ment pay was limited to the IRA context, id., at 202-203, 
815 P. 2d, at 57, a position we find unpersuasive. The 
court's view ignores the importance of this provision to 
understanding that Congress for many purposes does not 
consider military retirement pay to be current compensation 
for current services. The State's position is weakened 
further by another fact, that Kansas tax law considers 
military retirement benefits as current compensation under 
its general income tax provision but it does not for IRA 
deductibility purposes. The court asserted that "the 
distinction is not so much the characterization as current 
income or deferred compensation, but rather active versus 
passive activities required to earn the income." Id., at 203, 
815 P. 2d, at 57. But as the United States persuasively 
contends, "The State's failure to treat military retired pay 
consistently suggests that the State's articulated rationale 
is not in fact the basis for the disparate treatment, but only 
a cloak for discrimination against federally funded bene-
fits." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22. 
We therefore conclude that the Kansas Supreme Court's 
conclusion that, for purposes of state taxation, military 
retirement benefits may be characterized as current 
compensation for reduced current services does not survive 
analysis in light of the manner in which these benefits are 
calculated, our prior cases, or congressional intent as 
expressed in other provisions treating military retirement 
pay. For purposes of 4 U. S. C. § 111, military retirement 
benefits are to be considered deferred pay for past services. 
In this respect they are not significantly different from the 
benefits paid to Kansas state and local government 
retirees.5 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the 
5In listing the differences between the two classes of retirees involved 
here, the State Supreme Court also observed that Kansas state and local 
retirees have contributed to their retirement benefits and that their 
contributions have been taxed as part of their current income. Military 
personnel, on the other hand, do not contribute to their retirement bene-
fits, which are paid out of annual appropriations. As we read the court, 
however, it did not rest its decision on this difference and in the end 
returned to its basic holding that military retirees "receive current 
compensation while all persons receiving state and local government 
retirement benefits receive deferred compensation." 249 Kan., at 205, 
815 P. 2d, at 58. Moreover, we note that the State applies its income tax 
to other federal retirees who contributed to their benefits, such as 
members of the Central Intelligence Agency, Foreign Service, bankruptcy 
„^0+vofac . g e e fot£ 
Kansas Supreme Court and remand the case for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, 
concurring. 
While I agree with the Court's explanation of why this 
case is controlled by Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 
489 U. S. 803 (1989), I remain convinced that that case 
seriously misapplied the doctrine of intergovernmental tax 
immunity. A state tax burden that is shared equally by 
federal retirees and the vast majority of the State's citizens 
does not discriminate against those retirees. See id., at 
823-824 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). The Federal Govern-
ment has a legitimate interest in protecting its employees 
from disparate treatment, but federal judges should not be 
able to claim a tax exemption simply because a State 
decides to give such a benefit to the members of its judi-
ciary instead of raising their salaries. I write separately to 
make this point because what I regard as this Court's 
perverse application of the nondiscrimination principle is 
subject to review and correction by Congress. See Pruden-
tial Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408 (1946). 
KEVIN M. FOWLER, Topcka, Kan. (JOHN C. FRIEDEN, FRIE-
DEN, HAYNES & FORBES, KENTON C. GRANGER, RAY-
MOND L. DAHLBERG, ANGELA K. GREEN, NIEWALD, 
WALDECK & BROWN P.C., ROGER M. THEIS, TERENCE A. 
LOBER, and DAVIS, BEALL, McGUIRE & THOMPSON, 
CHTD., on the briefs) for petitioners; JOHN F. MANNING, Assis-
tant to Solicitor General (KENNETH W. STARR, Sol. Gen., SHIR-
LEY D. PETERSON, Asst. Atty. Gen., LAWRENCE G. WAL-
LACE, Dpty. Sol. Gen., DAVID ENGLISH CARMACK, and JOY 
L. PR1TTS, Justice Dept. attys., on the briefs) for U.S. as amicus 
curiae in support of petitioners; JAMES A.D. BARTLE, Kansas 
Special Assistant Attorney General (MARK A. BURGHART, and 
MICHAEL M. REHM, on the briefs) for respondents. 
Nos. 90-1341 AND 90-1517 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, 
PETITIONERS 
90-1341 v. 
OHIO ET AL. 
OHIO, ET AL., PETITIONERS 
90-1517 v. 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
Syllabus 
No. 90-1341. Argued December 3, 1991—Decided April 21, 1992* 
The Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) prohibit the discharge or disposal of 
pollutants without a permit, assign primary authority to issue 
permits to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and allow 
EPA to authorize a State to supplant the federal permit' program 
with one of its own under specified circumstances. Respondent State 
sued petitioner Department of Energy (DOE) over its operation of a 
uranium-processing plant in Ohio, seeking, among other relief, both 
state and federal civil penalties for past violations of the CWA and 
* Together with No. 90-1517, Ohio et aL v. United States Department 
of Energy, also on certiorari to the same court. 
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INTEREST OP A M I C I CURIAE 
This brief in suppor t of Kansas is submi t t ed on beha 
of Ar izona , Arkansas , Georgia , Iowa , M o n t a n a , Okie 
homa , Utah , Virginia and Wisconsin p u r s u a n t to Unite 
States Supreme Cour t Rule 37. 
The quest ion presented in this case was genera ted b 
this Cou i t ' s decision in Davis v. Michigan Department of tl 
Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989) ("Davis"), re lat ing to th 
taxation of federal, s tate and local gove rnmen t ret iremer 
benefits. The effect of the Cour t ' s decision in Davis wa 
not only to undo certain aspects of the income tax struc 
ture in at least twenty- three s tates but also to raise th 
issue of u n d e r w h a t c i rcumstances these s ta tes mus 
refund taxes previously imposed . 
This case is thus an example of how a single Unitec 
Sta tes S u p r e m e Cour t dec is ion dec l a r i ng a s t a te ta 
unconst i tu t ional can profoundly affect the tax s t ruc ture ii 
n u m e r o u s other states .and^impose^aj^ujiantjicipated^lia 
bility on such\s tales . For these reasons , amici cur iae hav< 
a direct and abid ing interest in the present case. 
• 
SUMMARY OF A R G U M E N T 
Amici curiae urge this Cour t to affirm the ruling oJ 
the court below that 4 U.S.C. § 111 as in terpre ted in Davis 
does not inval idate Kansas ' differential tax t reatment ol 
the pay of federal mili tary retirees and the retirement 
benefits of state and local government ret irees. Should 
this Cour t not affirm the rul ing of the court below, amici 
curiae urge this Cour t to expressly reserve the ques t ion of 
1 
•etroactivity of its decision until the issue can be fully 
fed and argued. The retroactivity question presents 
issue of particular complexity based on shifting 
reme Court plurality opinions, and its resolution 
Id have a massive financial impact on parties not 
>ent or represented. 
+ 
ARGUMENT 
STATES MAY, CONSISTENT WITH DAVIS, TREAT 
MILITARY RETIREMENT PAY DIFFERENTLY 
FROM STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
RETIREMENT BENEFITS. 
Amici curiae adopt and fully support the argument 
Respondents that the Court's Davis decision should not 
expanded to invalidate the differential state taxation 
tween federal military retirees and the retirement bene-
s of civil state and local government retirees. As shown 
Respondents' brief, significant differences in these two 
itegories of taxpayers justify such treatment under the 
st set forth in Davis for application of 4 U.S.C. § 111. 
mici curiae therefore urge the Court to affirm the ruling 
elow. Should the Court decide that a state's tax system 
\ay not, consistent with Davis, include such a differential 
ix treatment, amici curiae ask, in that case, that the 
)ourt expressly reserve the question of the retroactivity 
•f such a holding. 
• 
II. CERTIORARI WAS NOT GRANTED ON TH 
ISSUE OF RETROACTIVITY, AND THE COUR 
SHOULD EXPRESSLY RESERVE THAT ISSUE. 
The sole question decided by the courts below ar 
presented to this Court in the Petition for a Writ < 
Certiorari is "whether the Kansas Income Tax Act violat 
constitutional or statutory principles of intergovernme 
tal tax immunity, as recently applied in Davis v. Michig 
Dcpt. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989). . . . " Petition f 
Writ of Certiorari at i. Because the courts below held th 
the differential tax treatment under the Kansas Incor 
Tax Act did not violate the doctrine of intergovernmen 
tax immunity as applied in Davis and thus granted su 
mary judgment to defendants, they did not address t 
question of refunds or the retroactivity of Davis. 
While the retroactivity issue, therefore, is not p 
sented in this case, this Court in James B. Beam Distill 
Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991) ("Beam"), made t 
statements that are of significant concern to amici cur 
in the context of this case. First, Justice Souter in 
opinion stated that the remand of Bacchus Imports, Ltt 
Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984), for consideration of a defe 
raised by the state on the question of refunds "could 
fairly read" as an implicit ruling by the Court that Bacc 
applied retroactively. I l l S. Ct. at 2445. J a a y o i d ^ s i r n 
disposition ,in this case,...amici^curiae^urge^that^ 
remand order issuedby this Court expresslywstatejhat 
Court is not ruling on4the questionjof^retroactivityv 
The second statement in Beam of concern to a 
curiae is the statement by Justice Souter that "[blea 
the Bacchus opinion did not reserve the question whe 
4 
ts h o l d i n g s h o u l d be app l i ed to the par t ies before 
t, . . . it is proper ly unders tood to have followed the 
lormal rule of retroactive application in civil cases." I l l 
>. Ct. at 2445. To the extent that this s tatement indicates 
hat any decis ion of the Cour t is retroactive unless the 
Zourt express ly reserves the quest ion, amici curiae urge 
his Cour t expressly to reserve the question of the retro-
ictivity of its decision in this case. The Court may effec-
ively reserve the quest ion either by so stating in any 
e m a n d o rde r or by retaining jurisdiction and setting the 
etroact ivi ty issue for addi t ional briefing and argument . 
Reservation of the retroactivity issue is appropr ia te in 
his case because of the vast reach of the Davis decision 
nd the mass ive financial impact that such a ruling could 
lave on the affected states. 
On March 28, 1989, the Court decided Davis, holding 
hat s ta tes m a y not, consistent with the intergovernmen-
i l tax i m m u n i t y doctr ine embodied in 4 U.S.C. § 111, 
irovide a s ta te income tax benefit to state and local 
o v e r n m e n t retirees wi thout providing the same benefit 
o federal gove rnmen t retirees. At the time of the Davis 
ecision, at least twenty-three states had statutes similar 
D the Michigan s ta tute invalidated in Davis. Many of the 
ta tutes had been in effect and unchallenged for nearly 
alf a century. See, e.g., Ch. 325, 1942 Va. Acts 500. 
The Davis decision had two significant impacts on 
icse s ta tes . .First, Jhe„ s t a t e s affected by this unantici-
a ted c h a n g e in the federal law were put to the task of 
na lyz ing their tax systems and enacting amendments to 
r ing their sys tems in to ' compl i ance with Davis, often 
^suit ing in a loss^ofjanticipated and already budgeted 
5 
revenues. Second, the Davis decision generated litig 
in at least twenty-three states. This litigation presi 
two issues: (1) whether the s ta tes ' pre-Davis or post-
tax systems were or are consistent with Davis; and 
not consistent, whether states may fulfill their con 
tional obligation created by Davis by changing thei 
systems for the future or whe ther states must in adc 
give remedial relief, such as refunds, for taxes imp 
prior to Davis.'1 The latter issue in much of the 
litigation may depend , to a greater or lesser exten 
whether Davis is retroactive. 
Amici curiae submit that this issue should nc 
decided without the parties before the Court fully I 
ing and presenting oral a rgument on that issue, 
parties in the instant case have not sought certiorai 
this issue nor briefed it to the Court . Reserving d 
mination on the retroactivity issue is especially appr 
ate in this case for several reasons. The retroactivil 
the Cour t ' s decision could have a mass ive final 
impact on parties not present or represented. Re 
claims against states affected by Davis are estimate 
1
 In some states, taxpayers also brought suit pursua 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking to impose personal liability on 
officials and to collect attorney's fees. In the only federal 
to reach this issue, Judge ]. Harvey Wilkinson, writing fo 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, held that the state rev 
official was entitled to qualified immunity. Swanson v. Po 
937 F.2d 965 (4th Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3478 I 
Jan. 13, 1992) (to hold official liable would create miscari 
of justice because law not clearly established prior to D( 
xceed $2.2 billion.2 Moreover, as discussed below, the 
etroactivity issue is one of par t icular complexity based 
>n recent Supreme Cour t p recedent . See Beam, supra; 
\merican Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 
3 2 3 (1990) ("ATA"); McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alco-
wlic Beverages and Tobacco, 110 S. Ct. 2238 (1990) 
/'McKesson"). 
[II. THE RETROACTIVITY ISSUE IS TOO COMPLEX 
A N D FAR-REACHING T O BE DECIDED WITH-
OUT FULL BRIEFING A N D ARGUMENT. 
Because Michigan s t ipula ted to the payment of a 
refund to the taxpayer in Davis, the question of the retro-
activity of Davis was not presented in that case. Davis, 489 
U.S. at 817. As state courts were called upon to decide the 
ques t ion of refunds u n d e r their state laws following 
Davis, some states de te rmined that state law mandated 
refunds irrespective of the retroactivity or prospectivity 
of Davis. See, e.g., Hackman v. Director of Revenue, 771 
S.W.2d 77 (Mo. 1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 718 (1990). 
Other state courts de te rmined that taxpayers were not 
entitled to refunds on independen t state law grounds. 
See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 241 Va. 
232, 401 S.E.2d 868, vacated and remanded, 59 U.S.L.W. 3864 
(U.S. June 25, 1991), aff'd, 243 Va. , 410 S.E.2d 629 
(1991), petition for cert, filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Nov. 
15, 1991) (No. 91-794). 
2
 See W. Hellcrstein, Preliminary Reflections on McKesson 
and American Trucking Associations, 48 Tax Notes No. 3, 325, 326 
(July 16, 1990). 
In de termining . the^application *of .federal law 
state 's obligation u n d e r state law to refund taxes impc 
pr ior to Davis, s tate courts'-looked*-to'*thisvCourt's 
p ronouncements in ATA and McKesson for gu idance . Is 
recently, state courts have looked to the Cour t ' s 
decision in Beam. A review of Beam i llustrates the c 
plexity of the retroactivity issue now being li t igate 
numerous state courts . 3 
Justice Souter in Beam, like the four d issent ing 
tices in ATA, d is t inguishes between retroactivity 
choice of law principle and retroactivity as a remi 
principle. I l l S. Ct. at 2443. Justice Souter explains 
the choice of law aspect of retroactivity presents a fe< 
quest ion where the rule at issue derives from federal 
However , in tax cases such as the present one, " the r 
dial inquiry is one governed by state law, at least w 
the case originates in state court ." Id. 
It appears from this s ta tement that nothing in 
precludes the denial of refunds u n d e r state law in a 
such as the present one, regardless of this Cour t ' s 
sion on the substant ive issue presented. This conch 
is suppor ted by Justice Souter ' s s tatement on the na 
reach of the Beam decision: 
3
 Five opinions were written in Beam, none of which 
manded a majority of the Court. The lead opinion, writl 
Justice Souter, was joined by only Justice Stevens. Justice 
wrote a separate concurrence. Justices Blackmun, Marsha 
Scalia - in two separate opinions, each joined by the th 
them - also concurred separately. And there was a d 
written by Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Reh 
and Justice Kennedy. 
The grounds for our decision today are nar-
row. They are confined entirely to an issue of 
choice of law: when the Court has applied a rule 
of law to the litigants in one case it must do so 
with respect to all others not barred by pro-
cedural requirements or res judicata. We do not 
speculate as to the bounds or propriety of pure 
prospectivity. 
Nor do we speculate about the remedy that 
may be appropriate in this case; remedial issues 
were neither considered below nor argued to 
this Court, save for an effort by petitioner to 
buttress its claim by reference to our decision 
last Term in McKesson. As we have observed 
repeatedly, federal "issues of remedy . . . may 
well be intertwined with or their consideration 
obviated by, issues of state law/' Bacchus, 468 
U.S., at 277, 104 S.Ct., at 3058. Nothing we say 
here deprives respondent of his opportunity to 
raise procedural bars to recovery under state 
law or demonstrate reliance interest entitled to 
consideration in determining the nature of the 
remedy that must be provided, a matter with 
which McKesson did not deal. 
I l l S. Ct. at 2448. 
Following his distinction between retroactivity as a 
choice of law principle and as a remedial principle, Jus-
tice Souter also distinguishes between selective prospec-
tivity and pure prospectivity, citing Chevron Oil Co. v. 
Iluson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971) ("Chevron Oil"), as an example 
of pure prospectivity. I l l S. Ct. at 2443. In selective 
prospectivity, the Court may apply a rule of law to the 
litigants in one case but not to others whose facts arose 
before the announcement of the new decision. While 
tice Souter rejects selective prospectivity as a choi 
law principle, he does not "speculate as to the boun 
propriety of pure prospectivity." Id. at 2448. 
The,Court . in Davis * did not a p p l y the rule » 
announced retroactivelytsince>Michigan,vhad.remove 
issue by conceding to.the payment.oLrefunds."Ac 
ingly, it appears that Davis represents^ proper cas 
the application of pure prospectivity. 
It also appears from Beam that Chevron Oil rer 
the proper test for the determination of prospectivit) 
three dissenting Justices in Beam, Chief Justice Rehr 
and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, clearly adop 
standard. I l l S. Ct. at 2451 (Chevron Oil describes Cc 
long-established procedure for determining whether 
rule applies to conduct occurring before decision). Ji 
White, in his opinion concurring in the result in 
reaffirms his view, as expressed by Justice O'Connc 
the plurality in ATA, that in the proper case a new n 
law will not apply retroactively based on a Chevro 
analysis. I l l S. Ct. at 2449. Finally, while Justice S 
does not "speculate" as to the "bounds" of pure pro 
tivity, he does not suggest that he would overrule C/i 
0/7 but only that he would not apply it "to the en 
selective prospectivity. I l l S. Ct. at 2445. 
In summary, this Court's decision in Beam raise* 
issues for the instant case: (1) whether Davis is a p 
case for the application of pure prospectivity; (2) 
whether Chevron Oil applies to determine the pro 
tivity of Davis; (3) if so, whether Davis satisfies the 
ron Oil standard; and (4) if the answer to all or any < 
preceding ques t ions is no, whether this Court 's choice of 
law conclusion prec ludes an ult imate denial of remedial 
relief that is based on state law grounds. 
These issues are complex, interrelated and far-reach-
ing. Amici curiae u rge this Court to refrain from deciding 
these issues unti l they can be fully briefed and argued. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
The Cour t shou ld affirm the ruling of the court 
below. If the Cour t does not so affirm, it should not 
decide whether its decision is retroactive until the ques-
tion is fully briefed and argued to the Court. 
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